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THE ROUS Of THE PRIVATE SECTOR IE THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION THROUGH 1982
The Nicaraguan private sector functions today within a socialist 
framework despite a retrenchment in political pluralism and civil 
liberties* An Intricate oonfelaation of external and internal factors 
caused this retrenchment* This intricate combination is also responsible 
for the continued functioning of the Nicaraguan private sector, which is 
a social class of medium and large producers whose ultimate political 
expression is in the superior council of Private Enterprise (COSBP) 
Externally, Nicaragua's position in the world economy has forced the 
adoption of pragmatic economic measures* The Saadlnista government 
decided to honor the foreign debt inherited from the Somosa government*
The Sandinlsta government was cognisant of the experience of the Allende 
regime in Chile, when the Soviet Union was unable to provide the financial 
aid necessary to stabilise the regime* This action maintained Nicaraguan 
access to Eastern funds, it also created legitimacy for the private 
sector in the post revolution economy, due to Nicaragua's need for cash 
to counter the outflow of debt payments* The Nicaraguan government viewed 
private sector dominance in the export production sector as necessary for 
efficiency and high productivity.
W>. tioitad Stata. tMfOHw to tha Hioartouan' Jar ifiil itot ' ■ '-
important atctomal facto)r inflttaacing tha poaition of tha private aactor 
within tha revolution. Tha Carter adadniatration attaaptad to
the private sector by directing aid, both covert and overt, to various
■ g ' ■ ■ ■private sector organisations• This approach did politically strengthen 
the private sector but also increased the potential for conflict. The 
private sector relationship with the United States, a capitalist super* 
power opposed to the socialist alas of the revolution, heightens class 
tensions. The Reagan administration's policy of supporting counterrev­
olutionary groups aiming to overthrow the Sandinists regime has created 
a security crisis. The repercussions of this security crisis have curtailed 
the amount of pluralism permitted in Nicaragua, thus directly affecting 
the role of the private sector. External factors continue to play a 
strong role in determining the position of the private sector within 
post revolutionary Nicaragua.
Internally, the private sector has always feared the ideological 
foundation of the Sandinista movement. The Sandinistas are comprised of 
various strains of leftists, ail advocating broadly based social change. 
Distrustful of socialism in general, the private sector fears economic 
and political reorganisation along the lines of the Cuban model, in 
particular, a completely nationalised economy and a one party police 
state. Although the Sandinistas guaranteed the existence of a private 
sector and a commitment to a mixed economy, the private sector generally 
believed its role within the revolution was not clearly defined. The 
private sector fears the long tern goals of the movement, being particularly
worried that ***** it4 in reconstructinc the seoncnv* thsvwill Sib'-
nationalised by the Sandinistas* Private sector insecurity strongly in* 
fluoncss its response towards the Sandinists regime*
Hass participation in the Sandinists movement altered the political
structure of Nicaragua when social classes previously uninvolved were in­
cluded in the political process* This broadening of the political 
spectrum caused unavoidable conflict within Nicaragua because it weakened
the political power of the private sector vis a vis other classes* However, 
the political weakness of the private sector under Somosa mitigated this 
conflict to a degree. This also held true in the economic realm, where 
the Somosa government had exercised a strong presence* in fact, the 
Sandinistas at first nationalised only that property which belonged to 
Somosa and his allies* Thus, there are many continuities as well as changes 
in post Somosa Nicaragua* This blend of continuity and change makes 
possible both compromise and confrontation* Mhat occurs will depend 
upon choices made by the Sandinistas, the private sector and external 
powers, especially the United States*
CHAPTER It fitft HISTORICAL ORIGINS Of TUB PRIVATE SmCTtEt
PRE-SOMOZA NICARAGUA
The composition of the Nicaraguan private sector as At existed during 
the revolution began to be defined in the late 1900*s as Hicarafua dietl* 
oped coffee cultivation. The spread of coffee cultivation interested 
Nicaragua into the world export market*3 The emergence of a coffee 
producing sector complemsnted rather than displaced the traditional pri­
vate sector, based on beef production and large landholdings*4 Ihe ex­
pansion of coffee production did displace peasants, however* The ooffee 
producers took over Indian communal land, as veil as church land aid small 
farms* Peasant discontent would provide an important senses of support 
for guerrilla movements starting with the antl-intervemtionery war led 
by Cesar Saadiao*
The private sector divided the political spectrum into two malm
parties which were regionally based* The Liberal Party, with strong
ties to the coffee producing sector, was centered in Leon, to the north
of Managua* The Conservative Party, originally based on the beef production
sector, based its activities in Granada, to the south of Managua* Although
some historical differences between those aided and hurt by the liberal
economic reforms of the Bourbons in the period before independence from 
5Spain, by the time of the introduction of coffee the conservatives had 
essentially accepted capitalist doctrine and liber id economic theory*4 
Political conflict did occur among the private sector despite its ideologi­
cal homogenity* The growth of the coffee economy caused a realignment of 
the power structure during the sixteen year rule of the Liberal Jose Santos 
Belaya (1193-1909)* This shift benefit ted the new rich in the coffee pro­
ducing export sector at the expense of the aristocratic large landholders*
*oUUu*l m i U *  « w c  tikis sfclft la 9m m  is «ta» iatarwaafelM
tin Ifeatm Marin*. in i m §. * United BtstM feiiiticy pcw n o.
l W k M  it aaltsiaail until 1»33, priaorily to buttrsss tiMi |»iitieal 
• m i m w e  ©f th« osaasamtlv* Party, whiefc tin Unitsd statss i M t d U s d  
l» IP**.’
H i  Nicaraguan private Motor aesrged from the rule of seiaya oom- 
pe*ed primarily of larger landowner* tod important merchants. The*# people 
ofton hold high civilian and Military position* in government, which was 
important in determiftisig who was swarded government contracts* Disputes, 
intrigues and an almost constant splitting sad recombination of factions 
eoourrsit but tboss political Machinations centered asrs on attempts to 
gain accass to tho spoilt of offios at opposed to m U t e g  change or soon 
rofoidi Thu Conservativs Party, supportod by tho United States, maintained 
unchallsngad oontrol until a Literal revolt occurred in the town of 
Bluafialds on tho Atlantic Coaat in 1926. The United States booses 
hsavily involvsd as ths revolt spread end the Conservative president,
Adolfo Dias, reguested Military assistance. Eventually 5400 United States 
troops would participate, on May 12, 1927 a compromise between the 
Liberals and the Conservatives was nsgotiatsd. All Literal generals 
surrendered sxcept one, Cesar Sandino, who protested against the continued 
presence of the United states. Sandino, based on strong peasant support, 
dirsetsd a guerrilla war from 1927-1932.8 Ths peasant support of Sandino 
indicates that bourgeoisie-peasant conflict has existed for a long ties 
in Nicaragua.
the bbqinnxng op r m  sqmoza era
In June, 1921 the Nicaraguan government conliiii a retired W i M l  
States Army Major, Cal via B. Carter, to head the newly forms# Nlfcionai 
Guard and its training school.* The United Stages strongly sugpearted 
the formation of the Guard, which it viewed as a military form tUpfcle 
of controlling Nicaragua’s domestic disturbances, then supplaiitiaii direct 
United States military intervention. Support of the Nattgihl Guard Be­
came a fundamental tenet of United States foreign policy up until two 
weeks before the Sandinista triumph.10 Since the private sector viewed 
United States support as vital to Nicaragua, the United States predisposition 
towards the Guard would be inf luential in determining privet# motor re­
sponses to the tiwsaia regime, in the latter stage* of the revolution 
conflict over m e  retention or dissolution of the Nmtioxml Onard vault 
cause dimisions within the private teeter as wall as bstmosn factions of 
the private sector end other classes*
In 1932, Anastasio Somosa Garcia, a nephew of Juan Batista Sacasa, 
was appointed to head the National Guard. The United States withdrew 
its troops in 1933 under Franklin Dalano Roosevelt's "Good Neighho?* 
policy.11 The creation of tho National Guard greatly facilitated this 
move. This move also provided Anastasio Somosa with his firm major 
opportunity to consolidate hit control over tho Guard. Cesar Sandino, 
seaing his goal of forcing the rsmoval of the United States military 
achieved, surrendered. President Sacasa, unwilling to see Nicaragua*1 
internal turmoil prolonged made conoilatory gestures toward sandino 
which were met with extras* disapproval within the National Guard* In
ori«r to mkmumme loyalty of th« National Guard, Somasa oadorad tHi 
aaaaaalnattaarof smMm. «*a national Guard piokad up Sandino aa ha 
left diimar efcth Sec— a at tfea jMtlMMk Palace. They than drove Saadiao
to a naarby field ae«$ executed Man. fba national (Juaxd proceeded ea aruafc
. 12 ■ ■Sandiniata reedLstanee to toe countryside. The asaaaai nation of Sandino 
enabled 8awesato goto strong control over tip National Guar* which he 
seen translated tope control over too political, apparatus. mveatueddy 
the Guards' functions would include the national radio and telegraph 
service, the service, isRigratiOfi, customs (which included tod
transportation of anna, munitions and eeploeive*), tea collection, operating 
the railways, the national health services, all police functions and tos 
operation of the Of fine of Neticnal Security, which sp e e d - ee domestic
13dissidentso
Somcaa increased his powee thrcepii a eeeeeeefsd fernsmla ed effhMihhei 
and oo-opting deawstic power contenders and cultivating toe United States.14 
By 1937 Somosa had managed to engineer hie election as President, m i well 
as maintatotog his position as heed of ths National Guard•15 Somosa's 
control over toe political apparatus enabled him to bttild up a powerful 
economic base which played a key role in directing the course taken by 
to Nicaraguan private sector both economically and politically. Eventually 
the Semosas would be able to operate from a monopoly position within the 
Nicaraguan economy, thus limiting the political autonomy and economic 
independence of other private sector factions. this ©cnsoUditioft of 
Somosa control over the private sector would only hi broken by the after- 
math of the 1972
-8-
nastosio somoza Oardia increased M« weelth through his control of 
the govi"^ HM«t by several mans, m m i e* ample® ate Presidential coumis-
sions/execueive leavies on concessions %e exploit natural resources, 
bribes and Ian# mmmrnM. Somci* I si let} land! belaying to thi followers 
of Sandino and Caeita# lead during World War II, which he then raiold to 
his relatives aed himself ** lew prices. tHia ihcotie tttddte Risible a wide 
range of jnesetaioets mth m  wt«*
at M m t t U a K ,  0 tamm y , a m m h  faekoty, § PHnni fictoty, tha NdtiOhal 
Insurance Company, the electric pern w  eeMt>«ftlc« It lava**! eiU»»* urban 
property, the nempaper towadadec, umtsttm i|tf ■*■«{:*, fribeHba
i«d stock in the united Stamm, Caaade aad Gent* Hied. tky IM S  •*#»»»•'■ 
wealth m m  oonaarvaeiarVy eer f aFad ad Mm I M  41)4 «l*fcy million 
dollars.1* A s  l i o n  dyaaaiy m m  tirntf aafcrenahwl M  S t«Ufcldal and 
eoonomic <«m  in Winer a^a
The private carter aswspM  t s s s U M s  a define Of political and 
ennacwfr autaaowy dartof the early stayaw of the Sowo«a eta. HBWWveri 
laowaffitay nsasrs political. sad ecewowdc paaar tMastaned to alter the 
exintiitf political hadaean, the faihad dkahaa pdayad * pivotal fold by 
influanciag the diractiaa of ahcersyu—  yeUtics. The 1*rited State# jdpo- 
vidad asaaatial aayi iat to the caeaiwatiwa M t ,  Which aadbldl f# to 
rewain in pnaat t m  m i  aatu 1*1). th* aafeaad taaaaa else adyoddtdd 
the ereetiea of the Natiewal Guard, which was ha baeaaa the foundation of 
Sowosa pswer. Finally, the Unite# State* baaaaa « haakiaa of support for 
the M ace a regiaw due to a dawire t m  *ahabdmy * Bee «a 011 thaae
f n-iftra ^ua #"w rdb f na A ■n an ,^Miwaha ihStdi «MnaiS and(^P(BbbWPBRpw iBj^rXF jpPPJffie vjFitj^p
eoeeeede boes^
THE POST W m  BOOM
A world-wide economic boom occurred following World War II, In 
Nicaragua this boom caused a strengthening of the rural private sector. 
Nascent domestic industries which developed during the involuntarily 
protected markets of the war years were unable to compete against in­
dustries from fully developed countries. These industries were snuffed 
out as investment was rechanneled into basic commodities for export, 
Nicaragua developed a primarily export agrarian economy, Tim develop­
ment of the export economy both aided and reinforced the construction 
of Nicaragua’s basic infrastructure.18 Based on this infrastructure and 
aided by technological advancements in fertiliser, pesticides and seed, 
the cultivation of cotten became suitable feu: the Nicaraguan climate ami 
soon complemented the established coffee sector, Exports diversified ae 
new crops appeared, including sugar, wood, bananas and seafood, but cotten 
was by far the most important new export* In 1949 the cotton harvest 
consisted of only 24* nitric tons while in 1955 43,971 metric tons were
produced. Eventually 80 percent of all cultivated Pacific Coast land
19would be planted in cotten.
Three distinct private sector factions emerged during the 1958's* The 
©West faction would trace its origins to an economic response by Granada 
based conservative families to doing business under the increasingly re­
pressive Liberal President Zelaya at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Affiliated with the Banco de America (Banamdrica), this group 
grew to inefude sugar^ rum, cattle, coffee, the export-import business, 
department stores and supermarkets, it had international ties with the 
Wells Fargo Sank and the First National Bank of Boston, The second group
-9-
developed in the late 1950*8 in response to the increasing strength of 
the Banamdrica and Somocista factions. This group affiliated with the 
Banco Nicaragdense (BANic). Centered in Ledn, this group was associated 
with the Liberal Party. It contained coffee, Gotten, a major beer in* 
dustry, merchants and commercial enterprises, land development and con­
struction, lumber, fish and vegetable oil processing. Chase Manhattan 
Bank of Mew York provided the major foreign tie of this faction. The 
third faction contained Somosa and his allies, known as Somocistas. The 
Somocistas possessed holdings in all sectors of the economy. M i s  group
associated with the banco Nacional and the Banco Central and ultimately
20with the Banco centroawerioans. United states lending agencies required
that private banking groups be non-political, so after 1955 these groups
were formally disassociated with political parties.21 In reality, these
groupings enabled part of the capitalist sector to maintain a degree of
22economic independence from the state through the 1950's.
During this period the private sector displayed a general pattern of
cooperation and occasional attempts to do away with the Somosa regime.
A limited private sector opposition satiated within the Conservative Party.
The Chamorro, Cuadra, Zavala, Solofzans and Pasos families provided the
23most dedicated opposition. The most vocal opposition family was the
Chamorros. In 1930, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Zelaya purchased the daily
newspaper La Prensa. His son, Pedro Joaquin Chamorror Cardenal, became
a key private sector individual, deeply involved in anti-Somosa operations.
Pedro Joaquin chamorror Cardenal spent the 1940's exiled in Mexico. He
returned to Nicaragua and spent the years from 1954 to 1956 in prison for
24allegedly organising a revolt. After his release, Chamorro founded,
-11-
along with Antonio ViIlea, the National Union of Popular Action (UNAP)„
UNAP was a forerunner of the Nicaraguan Social Christian Party, a secular
and reformist organization advocating peaceful social change*
A dissenting faction within the Liberal Party formed the Independent
Liberal Party in 1944. This party was constitutionalist and based on
25Keynesian economics* Professionals, salaried workers and small business
interests formed the primary constituency of the Independent Liberal Party*
This faction split with the mainline Liberal Party due to the increasing
domination of the Somosa faction. The Independent Liberals formed the
Democratic Youth Front (FJD), This youth organisation won fame for being
the starting point of Tomrfs Borge Martinez1! political career* Borge, one
of the founders of the FSLN, is currently the Interior Minister* After the
assassination of Anastasio Somosa Garcia on September 21, 1956, UNAP fell
26apart due to the post assassination repression* Pedro Joaquin Chamorro
Cardenal was one of three thousand people arrested for suspected complicity
27in the assassination.
The assassination of Anastasio Somosa Garcia ironically indicated the
grwotng strength of the Somocista faction and the weakness of the private
sector* The collapse of UNAP was only one indication of the weakness of
private sector dissent. The opposition private sector could not prevent
the assumption of the Presidency by Luis Somosa Deboyle and the leadership
of the National Guard by Anastasio Somosa Deboyle, the sons of Anastasis
Somosa Garcia* United States hacking of the Somosa faction strongly in-
28fluenced this transfer of power* The private sector opposition proved 
unable to attract a mass following large enough to dislodge the Scmosas 
twice in 1959* After escaping from prison in 1957, Pedro Chamorro launched
•12
an attempt to seize the government by force in 1959* The Somosa government
through the National Guard easily suppressed this attempt* The Somosas
also easily controlled a 1959 business led general strike by suspending
29import licenses belonging to strike supporters. By the end of the 1950's,
the limited private sector dissent was clearly unable to dislodge the Somosas*
During the 1950's significant economic expansion led to a degree of
modernisation* Capital accumulation began to be transferred to industry#
finance and commerce* Traditional diminsions within the private sector#
based on the production of certain export crops and heavily influenced by
regionalism# were weakened but not broken down as new areas of production
developed. Cotton production and secondarily coffee and beef formed the
30basis for this expansion* Since cotton cultivation is a capital intensive 
industry# requiring tractors# harvestors# irrigation systems# fertilisers 
and insecticides# agrarian properties became concentrated in fewer hands*3* 
Peasants responded by moving to urban areas# particularly Managua* This 
economic expansion was unable to accomodate for these displaced peasants 
and the Managua shantytown began to grow* Thus# the 1950's saw growing 
Somocista power# growing diversity and disunity among the traditional 
private sector opposition and an increase in the marginalisation of the 
lower classes# primarily peasants# in Nicaraguan society*
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET ERA
The Central American Common Market (CACM)# formed in 1960# continued 
the alteration of the Nicaraguan private sector which began in the 1950's* 
Regional economic integration provided increased incentives for industrial- 
ization and also stimulated diversification of exports*32 By this time the
Nicaraguan government controlled fiscal, credit and commercial concessions 
and privileges to the point where all industry developed under its moderation 
Since the Somosas controlled the government, the Somocista faction dominated 
this new phase of economic expansion. Foreign investment became increasing­
ly important, growing by 404 percent between 1959 and 1959. the United 
States provided a significant degree of investment but other CAGM countries,
Europe and Japan also contributed to the Influx of foreign capital. Despite
33this increase in investment funds Nicaragua*s foreign Indebtedness grew.
The strong government role in the economy forced capital in the Con­
servative Party under the control of the state. The Conservatives were
34unable to overcome this control through election or coup. The Somosa
government made a conciliatory gesture aimed at pacifying the opposition
and demonstrating for United States benefit that Nicaragua tolerated dissent
by freeing Pedro Chamorro after his foiled invasion attempt. Chamorro then
formed the Popular Christian Democratic Movement (MPDC), which became a
powerful faction within the Conservative Party. The MPDC had roots in one
faction of UNAP, an organisation formed by Chamorro which broke into two
factions following the assassination of Anastasio Somosa Garcia. The other
faction of UNAP formed the Nicaraguan Social Christian Party (PSCN). In
1963 most of the MPDC faction joined the PSCN because Fernando Agiiero, one
of the MPDC'a leading politicians, switched allegiances from the MPDC
faction to the old line conservatives. This influx of new members gave
the PSCN a boost in strength which enabled it to win a seat in the
35Nicaraguan Congress.
During the Common Market era, Conservative Party independence ended.
The increasing economic power of the state diminished the vitality of 
political conflict within the private sector. The formation of the PSCN 
represented private sector dissent with the traditional political repre­
sentation. However, this dissent waa limited to the PSCN winning one
aeat in the Nicaraguan Congress. Hie Coneervative Party remained the
main opposition party. The 1971 Somosa/Aguero pact formalised the dependence
of the Conservative Party. This pact enabled Anastasia Somosa Deboyle,
who had succeeded his brother Luis in the Presidency following the letters
fatal heart attack in 1967 to maintain control while he fulfilled Nicaraguan
constitutional requirements which prohibited the President from succeeding
himself. The pact called for a triumvirate of two Liberals nad a Conserve*
tive to jointly rule Nicaragua while Somosa served as the head of the 
36National Guard. The Conservative Party inability to gain more strength
than this shows a decrease in political power. The 1960's saw the
strengthening of Somosa control to its highest level*
Two pillars of support formed the basis for Somosa power, the National
Guard and support from the United States. Somosa developed Unites States
support by completely supporting United States foreign policy, in 1954
Nicaragua provided the main staging point for a CIA sponsored invasion of
Guatemala which overthrew the mildly progressive Arbens regime. In 1961
Nicaragua performed the same function for the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba.
In 1965 Nicaraguan troops participated in the Unites States occupation of
the Dominican Republic. The Somosas went as far as to offer Nicaraguan
troops to "fight Communism" in Korea and Vietnam. Under the Somosas
Nicaragua never voted against a United States resolution in the United 
37Nations. These actions provided the Somosas with staunch United States
«
support, a factor of extreme importance in determining the political 
balance of power.
Problems developed In the Central American Common Market by the end
of the 1960's. Because of their dependent position as producers of bulk
commodities for export, violent price fluctuations reaked havoc upon
Central American economics, whose combined markets were still extremely 
38narrow. In 1969 "Soccer Mar" between El Salvador and Honduras, coin*
ciding with the decline in international prices for primary agriculture
39and beef products, led to a period of stagnation in CACM economics.
This stagnation had mot ended when, in late December 1972, a powerful
40earthquake devasted Managua.
CHAPTHl III THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE SECTOR DISCONTENT
THE 1972 EARTHQUAKE
The post earthquake economic and political criaia cauaad daap rifts 
to occur within the private aactos. the earthquake cauaad sevara economic 
and aocidl dislocations. over eight thousand people ware killed. Eighty 
percent of the thirty three aquare kilometer urbanised area of manages 
waa destroyedi including the downtown Managua business section. Seventy- 
five percent of all housing was damaged lowing 290,000 people without 
shelter in a situation where housing conditions were already severe, 
fetal damage was estimated at 9S44.8 million (U.8.) To rebuild after 
the earthquate Managua wea utterly dependent on outside aid.43 Nicaragua 
received 97$ Million (U.fl.) from AID (912,7 Million in emergency grant 
assistance, $65.3 million in reeonstruotion loans) and 994 million (U.S.) 
from tha Xnteramerican Developnent Bank.43 This represents a significant 
part, but by no anana all of the loans, grants and other forms of ansistilhc 
received by Nicaragua following the earthquake. Anastasio Somosa, having 
declared a State of Emergency and thus imposing martial law, managed to 
force the processing of all relief through the government and tha offices 
of his own Libaral Party.44
Somosa control over the earthquake reconstruction mada possible all
aorta of Somocista economic activity ranging from the outwardly legitimate
appearing to plain thaft. Cornelia Hueek, President of the Nicaraguan
Congrsas and a long time Somosa ally, purchased empty land earmarked tor
low-income housing for $17,000 and resold it to tha government for $1.2 
45million. Col. Rafael Adonis Porras Largaespeda, military aide-de-camp 
to Anastasio Somosa, paid 971,421 for some land on June 4, 1979. Ha sold 
it to tha government on September 24, 1979 for 93,342,M O . 44 these
17
incidents are only examples of a general trend of fraud occurring in joint 
purchases between U.S. AID and the Nicaraguan government.*^ Somosa economic 
strength and control over the reconstruction effort vastly enriched the 
Somosa faction.
After the earthquake, Somosa invested in demolition, earth moving, 
heavy equipment, construction materials, premixed concrete, paving, metal 
buildings, pipe and tubing, real estate development, land and housing.*9 
ESPESA, a Somosa company, did all the demolition work. Another Somosa 
company, Immuebles SA, did all real estate speculation. Fifty new con* 
struction companies app end, the most prominent of which wore all somosa 
controlled. These companies built cheap housing and sold it to tho govern­
ment at four or five times ite real value, 91101110 stones made in a Somosa
49factory with Somosa cement replaced asphalt on roadways. The National 
Ouard dissolved immediately following the eertlwpake am individual soldiers 
deserted to protect their families. ** when the Oiaami rsaoserafelei, it set 
up a post earthquake black market, the d W M t  m i  tinned foci, clothing, 
email electric generators, watet purifiers, electric teredos, pickaxes, 
spades and even goods stolen from government warehouses,5*
The huge influx of international public and private funds, followed
by favorable prices for sugar, beef and coffee experts caused a reactivation
of the Nicaraguan economy, in 1973 the Grose Domestic Product grow 2.1
percent, reaching $772 million. There was a 10 percent increase in exports
to $275.7 million.52 But the Somosa faction, violating traditional capital!#!
ethics, took over the most dynamic areas of capital accumulation.5* The
54personal wealth of Anastasio Somosa grew to over $400 million. The blatant 
corruption and unfair competition of the Somocista faction following the 
1972 earthquake gave birth to a dedicated anti-Somoza movement within the
-18-
private sector. Private sector political vitality re-emerged on a scale
not seen in Nicaragua since the introduction of coffee cultivation in
the late 1800's had accelreated the integration of Nicaragua into the
world economy. Somoza himself noted the increased activism of the private
sector, noting that: "There is no doubt in my mind that the decision to
rebuild (Managua) on the outskirts represented the turning point in my
55support from the business and financial community."
POST EARTHQUAKE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Following the earthquake, certain private sector organizations took 
on increasingly hardline anti-Somoza stance. An important private sector 
group was the Superior Council of Private Initiative (COSIP), which was 
the forerunner of COSEP. COSIP provided unified representation for the 
Nicaraguan Chamber of Industry, Chamber of Commerce and Cotton, cattle 
and coffee producers. The Nicaragua Development Institute (INDE), was 
another influential private sector organization. INDE was founded in 
1963 the Alliance for Progress to promote community development, coopera- 7:1,:<4
'■4
tion, education, improved public services and community-government coopera- j
tion through "democratic means and the free enterprise system." Under the
leadership of Felipe M£ntica, Enrique Dreyfuss, Alfonso Robelo Callejas j
56 ■ 1and William Baez INDE and COSIP became extremely critical of the government. 3i
All of these men became key private sector opposition figures.
Political discontent with His Somoza regime prompted twenty seven 
leaders representing serren political movements and two trade unions to 
call for an election boycott on July 8, 1974. This discontent culminated 




1974. The UDEL was a coalition Movement composed of the Christian Social
Party, the Independent Liberal Party, the Socialist Party of Nicaragua,
Conservative National Action, the Constitutionalist Movement, the National
Mobilizacion, National Salvation, the General Confederation of Labor and
57the National Workers Federation. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro served as its
58Secretary-General. The UDEL was significant for several reasons.
The UDEL differed from previous private sector initiatives because
it advocated progressive actions such as agrarian and election reform.
The UDEL hoped to convince the United Sates that they could provide a
59ncn-revolutionary alternative to Somoza rule. Although the UDEL con­
tained representatives of different sectors of the Nicaraguan population, 
the private sector remained firmly in control of the movement. The pri­
vate sector maintained control of the anti-Somoza movement until the mass 
mobilizacion of the population under the leadership of thj Sandinistas 
occurred in the latter stages of the revolution. Despite this private
sector control the BANIC and BANAMERICA groups and the traditional
61opposition parties resented the pluralist composition and slightly left
of center program of the UDEL. These groups preferred to either cooperate
with Somoza or plot against the government with high ranking National Guard
62and government officials. The Nicaraguan private sector, coa^osed of 
diverse factions, did not make the homogeneous response to either Somoza 
or the Sandinistas. It is necessary to recognize this diversity when 
assessing the private sector role within the revolution.
Following the earthquake, political activity increased throughout 
Nicaraguan society. Inflation, sharpened recessionary cycles and rising 
unemployment afflicted the salaried middle sector and the student population
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with declining income and a lack of job opportunities. The middle
class formed several unions during this period, such as the National
Association of Educators of Nicaragua (ANDEN), the Federation of
Nicaraguan Teachers (FMN), the National Employees Union (UNE), and the
Association of Women Confronting National Problems (AMPRONAC). These
unions became actively anti-Somoza fallowing the earthquake.**
Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tdmas Bor 'e Martinez, and Silvis Mayorga
65founded the Sandinista Front for National Liberation in 1961. The FSLN 
advocated the draining of government strength through a long war of
66attrition thus precipitating the internal decomposition of the dictatorship.
The predominately urban, upper class membership of the FSLN began to win
over the peasantry and some segments of the labor force by the early 1970*s.
The corruption of Somoza in distributing reconstruction funds enabled the
FSLN to gain organizational strength. Despite the increase in public
sector housing following the earthquake, Nicaragues housing deficit in*
creased. The destroyed housing combined with demographic growth caused a
need for housing roughly two times the government construction. What
housing the government did produce usually had dirt floors, lacked indoor
67services and was overcrowded. During this period the FSLN began to 
build an urban base.
The rise in export prices and the influx of foreign capital created
an agro-export boom. This boom instigated an increase in rural to urban
68migration as peasants were denied access to the land. Food prices rose 
as basic foods had to be imported. These developments worsened a desperate 
plight for the rural population. At this time 50 percent of all farms 
were located on 3.4 percent of all farmland, predominantly the poorer soil.
63
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The poorest 50 percent of the rural population had an annual incone of 
$35 per capita.69 The FXLN, still a small group with a limited base of 
support, began to build organizational links among the lower classes, 
which became increasingly receptive to the FSUi as conditions deteriorated.
During the post-earthquake period political activity increased, pre-
dominantely within the private sector but also in the middle and lower
classes. The FSLN increased its organization m o n g  the lower classes but
remained a weak political force overall. Polarizing trends which would
contribute to the mass mobilization vaulting the FSLN into control of the
opposition movement strengthened, but the private sector remained in
strong control of the opposition movement. The FSLN, encouraged by its
limited successes and the increasing activism of the population in general,
took a decisive action intended to increase FSLN political visibility,
70win the release of political prisoners and get funds. This action would 
effect everyone involved in Nicaraguan politics, particularly the private 
sector opposition.
THE CASTILLO PARTY RAID AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
On December , 1974 the FSLN assaulted a party being held at the 
home of Jose Marfa "Cherna" Castillo Quant, a high ranking Somocista of­
ficial. The guest of honor, United States Ambassador Turner B. Shelton, 
left the party a half hour before the raid. The guerrillas captured an 
an impressive list of dignitaries, including:
-Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, Nicaragua's Ambassador to 
Washington and Somoza's brother-in-law.
-Alejandro Montiel Arguello, Foreign Minister.
-Guillermo Lang, the Nicaraguan Counsel in New York City.
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-Daniel Lacayo Rapacciolli - Head of ESSO# Nicaragua 
-Noel Pallars Deboyle# President# National Economic 
Development Institute and first cousin of Somoza.
-Alfonso Deneken Die# Ambassador from Chile.73*
Due to the prominence of the hostages# Somoza met the FSLN demands. Fol­
lowing the release of the hostages# Somoza declared a State of Emergency# 
loosing martial law and press censorship.
During the State of Emergency the Somoza government censored the press 
gttite severly. The National Guard reviewed all publications# censored 
them and sent them back for publication. The government prohibited 
any article making reference to trade unions# labor disputes# allegations 
of defective public services# including transport roads and housing 
conditions. When the Catholic Church protested about National Guard 
peasant massacres committed under the guise of M counter insurgency#**
Somoza extended censorship to include church publications and radio
72broadcasts. This censorship effectively muzzled the private sector 
opposition# particulary the UDEL.
Somoza also launched a major counter offensive# Aguila Sexta# against
73the FSLN. Under the pretext of Aguila Sexta the National Guard attacked 
dissenting students. Since these students came from primarily upper class 
backgrounds# this had the effect of intensifying private sector feelings 
against the regime. In an attempt to win back dwindling private sector 
support and quell domestic disturbances# Somoza smashed trade union 
militancy. This move was highly unsuccessful# and Somoza thus forcefully 
suppressed any manifestations of private sector discontent.
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The Aguila Sexta campaign caused occurrences within the FSLN which 
would be of significance to the private sector* Under the strain of the 
campaigns divisions arose within the movement. Three different fractions 
were formed. One faction# the Proletariat Tendency (TP) developed an 
urban base. The Prolonged Peoples War (GPP) built a rural base* The 
GPP was a direct descendent of the original FSLN and contained important 
Sandinistas such as Tories Borge and Henry Ruiz. The most important faction 
in terms of the private sector were the third force# or Terceristas* The 
Terceristas exhibited a high degree of ideological pluralism and were to 
provide a key connection point between elements of the private sector op­
position aid the FSLN as the conflict intensified. Key Tercerista loaders 
were Daniel and Humberto Ortega# Bdln Pastora and Victor Tirado. The three
factions of the FSLN remained separate until 1979 and the build up of mass 
74opposition. Although political dissent had been temporarily stifled# 
anti-Somoza sentiment increased within the private sector* This increase 
in private sector anti-Somoza sentiment coincided with political divisions 
within the FSLN which established the preconditions for a revolutionary 
alliance*
THE RADICALIZATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Somoza lifted the State of Emergency in 1977 to appease the Carter
administration and international human rights organizations. On October 17#
1977# La Prensa published a full page appeal from twelve respected individuals
from the religious# intellectual and business communities. This appeal
called for popular insurrection to overthrow Somoza and also said that any
75political solution would have to include the FSLN. This group came to
24
be known as The Twelve. Key private sector individuals included the
industrialist Emilia Baltadano Pallais, the lawyer-businessman Joaquin
Cuardra Chamorro, supermarket magnet Felipe Mlntica and international
banker Arturo Crus. The Twelve presented a new level of private sector
dissent. They were the first faction of the private sector to establish
ties with the FSLN, through alliances with the Tercerista faction. In
1977 The Twelve fled Nicaragua for Costa Rica. From abroad they lobbied
76for international aid stoppage and organised anti-Somosa coalitions.
The Twelve represented the most progressive faction within the pri­
vate sector. Their recognition of the FSLN placed them to the far left 
of the private sector. INDE and COSIP provided a forum for other private
sector factions. INDE urged its members to not pay new taxes imposed to
77pay for the increasing cost of the National Guard. The INDE and COSIP
factions desired to oust Soaota but retain the basic political structures
including the National Guard and the Liberal Party. These factions aimed
to reestablish a more competitive business environment and stop the most
appalling human rights transgressions of the Somosa regime. On July 28,
781977, Anastasio Somosa suffered a severe heart attack. Blatant em- 
bezelement by the Somocrista faction, which did not expect its leader to 
recover, further discredited the government. Upon his recovery Somosa 
arrested General Ivan Alegret and dismissed several senior National Guard 
members for showing "excessive ambition." Somosa also removed Cornells 
Hueck as Secretary General of the Liberal Party, a position he had held 
for twenty years. The divergent tendencies within the private sector 
received their most significant boost since the 1972 earthquake shortly 
after the return of Anastasio Somosa.
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On January 10, 1978 Pedro Joaquin Chamorro was assassinated. Members
of the Somocista faction committed the assassination in response to an
exposer in La Prensa. The expose detailed the operations of blood plasma
business, one of whose owners inis Anastasio Somosa Portocarrero, son of
Anastasio Somoza Garcia. The company exported for a profit badly needed 
, 80Nicaraguan blood plasma. Although no Somozas were convicted for the 
assassination, it is difficult to believe that an attack of such significance 
could occur without high ranking approval.
Following the Chamorro assassination, the private sector became in­
creasingly active in opposition to Somoza. Chamorro had been the main op­
position figure during the forty year Somoza rule, and the private sector 
viewed his assassination as the ultimate affront to the concept of a
political opposition. On January 23, 1978 the UDSL, led by Rafael C.
81Rivias, and its private sector allies called a general strike, hoping 
to force the resignation of Somoza. Strikers paid partial salaries to 
workers while appealing to them to not participate in revolutionary 
activities. Outside of The Twelve, who believed that it would be necessary 
to include the FSLN in post-Somoza political representation, the political
philosophy of the private sector not actively cooperating with Somoza ,'■’1
during this period was expressed by William Baez Sacasa, Executive Secretary
■ 4
of the Nicaraguan Development Institute. Baez saids j
jwe're anti-Somoza and we're anti-Sandinist. We're j
in the middle, seeking a third solution which is the \
one promoted by the church, that of a national j




This view was not shared by the BANIC and BANAMER1CA leaders# who con­
tinued to conduct business with Somosa# refused to join the general strike
and condemned the UDEL and The Twelve for failing to offer "responsible
33leadership." This diversity within the private sector would become 
increasingly inportant as the situation polarised.
84During the first general strike, which ended February 7# 1978#
COSIP changed its name to COSEP# becoming the Superior Council of Private 
85Enterprise. In March# 1978, Alfonso Aobelo Callsjas formed the Nicaraguan
86Democratic Movement (MDN). Robelo previously had served as President of 
the Nicaraguan Chamber of industry (1972-75) and the Nicaraguan Develop­
ment Institute as well as COSEP (1976-78). The MDN, based on cotton growers
in the northwest# brought together young company directors who had led
87the first general strike. In May# 1978 the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) 
formed, This coalition originally contained the MDN, The Twelve# labor
aii
confederations and representatives of the traditional opposition. The
Twelve originally controlled the FAO but more conservative elements within
89the private sector soon established dominance. The United States re­
sponse to the political occurrances in Nicaragua played a key role in 
discrediting the FAO# leading to its abandonmsnt by The Twelve and other 
private sector organisations which would eventually join the FPN# a new 
coalition.
The strong United States support for Somosa dictatorship# which had
lasted for forty years# came to an end with the suspension of 1977-78
military credits to the Somosa government by the Carter administration.
90$12 million in economic aid was also suspended. Primarily in response 
to this# but also due to international apall at his gross human rights
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violations , Somosa revoked the State of Emergency. At the urging Of the 
National Security Council, President Carter sent a letter to Somoia 
praising his improvement of the human rights situation, This absurd 
statement, coming after a three year reign of terror, produced by a super­
ficial adjustment calculated to please the United States, typified the
vacillation of the Carter administration's approach to the Nicaraguan
91situation. United States vacillation was influential in discrediting 
the PAO. In response to the growth of a ‘’legitimate” opposition, ths 
United States proposed a prebiscite to determine which Nicaraguan political 
parties could participate in politics. Originally, ths PAD proposed a 
vote taking place with the Somosa family leaving the country. Somosa re­
jected these terms, the United States rsfussd to force his hand and 
support the FAO, and the PAO backed down. The PAO thus became discredited 
as the private sector opposition realigned to the left.
During this period the PSLN strengthened their political organisation 
in neighborhoods, factories and plantations. Strikes, demonstrations, 
and riots occurred with increasing frequency. Encouraged by this increase 
in political activity the Tercerista faction, led by Edln Pastora, took 
over the National Palace while the Congress was in session. Ths Tercerlttas 
captured five hundred leading figures of the regime. In exchange for 
these hostages the Sandinistas received ransom money, ths publication of
a pres8 communique, the release of political prisoners, and safe passage
92to Panama. This action greatly increased the visibility of ths PSLN.
The PSLN experienced its first big upsuring in recruiting following the 
93Palace seizure. Not wanting to lose momentum, the PSLN launched an
94offensive in September, 1978.
Th* private sector, Isd bp COS8P, called a bualhesa sit Ike to
tticoincide with the offensive. This strike was net coordinated with 
tite rebell attack in order to topple the Somosa government, but rather 
to apply pressure on the government while It was vulnerable because of 
the Sandinista attack, in order to force the removal of Somosa and the 
implementation of a political BOlution excluding the FBtN. The strike 
included T5 percent of ail business firms in HsnegUS and Up to 90 per­
cent in mamy provincial citiaa.9* The etrike eauaad « narksd decline 
in formkg* eaporta, further deatubiUtihg the regime.91
aemmee ssti tb* Matt***! «a»rd reacted te the sepi-ember effeneive 
b* 'w-caadng faurculy impressive. t *  «*e«d Hunched ait Ittlekl igainst 
the civiliam pepalmtbem* seised peeple in their hePa* dhd eWfUhed thti 
ms the street sad mats imil u p rsid erne of turture. They hlUmd eiviUana 
bf the thousands, After tbs September iaamrractien, enti-taemst mass 
mobilisation occur rad.
In July, 1978, the throe W  tendencies agree in principal to re- 
98unification. in September, the F§Uf formed the United Peoples Movement
99CMPU). The MPU became the political wing of the FSLN. The NPU played 
a key role in the formation of the National Patriotic Front (FEH>, a
coalition groining containing both the FILM and segments of the privet#
100sector. During this period the FSLN contained different strains of
socialists as well as non-socialists as ideological pluralism spread.*01
102By December 9, 1978 the FSLN had a unified command structure and on 
March 3, 1979 the complete reunification of all three tendencies occured.*03
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The polarization of the private r opposition was one of two
key factors leading to the reunifiest the FSLN. The other was
the rise of mass discontent. The bulk of the population took control of 
the revolution, outrunning even the most radical of the pre-established 
outlets for political expression. Daniel Ortega, a key Sandinista leader, 
admitted;
The truth is that we always thought of the masses, 
seeing them, however, as a prop for the guerrilla 
campaign that would enable it to deal some blows 
at the National Guard. Reality was quite different; 
guerrilla activity served as a prop for the masses, 
who crushed the enemy by means of insurrection.104
Mass mobilization forced the diverse factions within the anti-Somoza move­
ment to reconcile their differences. This reconciliation was achieved 
and or* February 1, 1979 the FPN formed.
The FPN united the MPU revolutionary coalition with other opposition
groups such as the Independent Liberals, the Popular Social Christians,
105the Group of Twelve and the Nicaraguan Communist Party. The official
Communist party thus gave its support for the first time to the FSLN, a
movement it had previously denounced as utopian. The FPN ended the period
of private sector dominance over the anti*So«tosa movement, which began
107with the formation of the lJDK in 19?d. The FSLN possessed the most 
power in the new coalition because they were the only existing political 
unit able to exercize 4 degree of control over, and thus give direction 
toward, the increasing mass based discontent. Not all of the private 
sector joined the FPN. Part of the private sector remained neutral, part, 
primarily segments of the Conservative Party, wanted only "conetitutionsl” 
change and part remained in active collusion with the Somozas. fheie 
segments of the private sector became increasingly isolated as the
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revolution progressed. The private sector joining the FPN played the 
m ;t important role in post Somoza Nicaragua.
THE FINAL OFFENSIVE
The VSUft* allied with segments of all classes in Nicaraguan society,
launched the final offensive in May, 1979. Up until the final offensive
108the Saasdinistas contained only 1200 troops. During the final offensive
109thetieanda of your? people in loosely organized militias joined the FSLN.
Coincid ing with an FSLN attack on Jinotega in the north and invasion from
Costa Rica in the south, the FPN called for a national strike on June 4,
1 9 7 9 . COSEP approved this strike}’10 which differed from previous strikes
because it aimed to topple the Somoza government in conjunction with the
FSLN/ instead of replacing Somoza in a manner which maintained the basic
structure of Nicaraguan politics and secluded the FSLN. Somoza declared
a State of Seige on June 7 as the rebels occupied moat of Lttin» Netagalpa,
Ocotal, Chichigalpa, Masaya, Siramlia and Gfifteda.111
On June 10, 1979 the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction fGJWtJ
announced its existence in Costa Rica. The Junta included Sergio Raft i f 1:
Mercado, Moises Hassan, Violeta Barrios Chamorro, Alfonso RofcsW
112Daniel Ortega Saaredra. Alfonso Rebels m 4  Violeta Barrios Chamorro,
the widow of Pedro Chamorro, were the private sector representatives on
the Junta. Sergio Ramirez Mercado, a member of the Group of Twelve, is
a novelist and intellectual. Ramirez lived briefly in the United $taeS,
studying university administration at the University of Kansas at Lawrence.
Moises Hassan led the MPU. He is a physicist who earned a Ph.D. from the
113University of North Carolina. Alfonso Rebels, leader of the 0 0  and
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a key private sector individual, also had educational experience in the
United States, earning a degree in Chemical Engineering from Rensalear
Polytechnic and doing graduate work in Political Science at Georgetown 
114University, Completing the Junta was Daniel Ortega Saavedra, a
Sandinista commander from the Tercerista faction who had helped forge
links with the business community. The cabinet members of the efcile
government included many private sector individuals, including Joagufh
Cuadra Chamorro (Finance) and Dionisio Marenco (Transportation and
Public Service) who were Christian Democrats, Reynaldo Tefal (Social
Security) and Noel Riya# Ge#te*i*ro (Industry) who were Conservatives
115and Virf Jiis Godoy §me* Uaftor) Who was an Independent Liberal.
116Although the provisional Junta had the support of FAO and COSEP 
and was visual y pluralistic, the United States refused to recognise 
the J m ta due to it# fSidt connections. The United States unsuccessfully 
lobbied for an OH# p###Ooeping fO/ce. The OAS responded by calling for 
Somovas immediate ousts/ &A recognition of the GJNP by a 17 to 2 vote, 
with Nicaragua and Paraguay again## and Guatemala, Honduras/ *1 Salvador, 
tfemgn«sy and ifcfcl# staining,11; Aft#/ this setback, the united States 
devised a new plan/ /ftie plan 6a) lad So/ & M M 9* resignation in favor 
of *c^mtitutin«alH' aac/*##*?. This ageceseor the# appoint a oeuneii
of r n e m § m m ^ m  and reaifn. U p  ^o^eii Jouid Utah iiiiate between 
Somoaafe fosses and the egpesiile*, ara#ting an interim govarnment of igth, 
which mould prepare for #J^t4ei# in }94i<*** the plan intended
to minimise fSLN influence the G d M  /ajeeto# i M P P  the FAO 
backed the G J M  l« tbt# daciaion?19 »ith ilia H l U t *  m §  0 M  the 
United States, finally ceme^eding that the tit# Si# t# to exclude
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from power, attempted to dilute FSLN strength in the Junta by proposing
120a number of conservative nominees be added to the Junta. These United 
States political maneuvres alienated virtually everyone involved, ex­
tended the conflict for two weeks, with all its concurrent human costs 
and benefited only the Somoza faction, which was preparing for expatriation. 
Only July 17, 1979 Anastasio Somoza, his family, the National Guard staff 
and the Liberal Party leadership left for Miami. On July 19, 1979 the
victorious Sandinistas entered Managua, ending the first phase of the
121Nicaraguan Revolution.
CHAPTER Hit THE FIRST YEAR
THE POSTWAR DESTRUCTION
During the Nicaraguan Revolution, twenty five to forty thousand
people were killed, 100,000 wounded, forty thousand orphaned and one-
fifth of the population made homeless* Immediately following the Re-
122volution one-third of the work force was unemployed* The National
Guard bombed towns, destroyed roads and burnt houses* The war disrupted
123communications and destroyed records* In retaliation for the three
general strikes Somosa destroyed most of the opposition owned industrial
124and commercial establishments* In June, 1979 the Nicaraguan Air Force
125bombed La Prensa out of production* The United States estimated direct 
damage to Nicaragua's infrastructure, plant, equipment and investories 
at $481 million* The war created a severe shortage of basic foods such 
as maise, beans, flour, milk, eggs, etc* the possibility of starvation 
existed.***
The Somocista factions made matters worse by looting the economy be­
fore they left* All non-movable assets were mortgaged to Somocista con­
trolled banks at two to three times their real value* The Somocistas 
slaughtered and exported, through Somosa owned meatpacking plants, so
much beef that Nicaragua filled its quota for export to the United States
127for 1979.by their July 17 departure date* Nicaragua's foreign debt
was so high by August, 1978 that the International Monetary Fund refused
Nicaraguan requests for loans when Nicaragua refused to submit a plan for
128economic and monetary reform* Somosa still managed to borrow $50 million 
from the Central American Monetary Council* The head of the Central
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American Monetary Council, Inear Barquero, also presided over Nicaragua's 
Central Bank* Despite the fact that the Somoza government received $30 
million from this source only six weeks before the Sandinist victory,
Arturo Cruz, the first post-Somoza director of the Central Bank, found
129only 3.5 million dollars in the banks accounts* After the revolution,
Nicaragua had a $1*650 billion external debt. Nicaragua had to repay
this debt in order to receive reconstruction capital from the international
130banking community*
The discipline and sophistication of the FSLN resulted in order
being restored quickly and prevented American intervention * *31 The FSLN
National Directorate (DNC) had ultimate political authority and at this
time enjoyed the overwhelming support of the vast majority of the popula- 
J 132tion* Therefore, the structure of political power essentially differed
from its prerevolutionary form* Despite its position of political supremacy
the FSLN tempered its ideological enthusiasm with economic pragmatism.
Humberto Ortega, a member of the FSLN Directorate, saids
we could do away with the bourgeoisie because we have 
enough support from the people* But.•.the bouraeoisie 
has a major role to play in the reconstruction.
This economic pragsnation led to its attempts to create a mixed economy*
THE MIXED ECONOMY
The new government feared that without adequate technical and adminis­
trative expertise, large scale redistribution would lead to a decline in
production, especially in export products, which provided hard currency
134Nicaragua desperately needed* The government needed he learn how to 
manage the large percentage of the economy left by the Somoza faction
rather than pursue more nationalizations* The government controlled
136about 25 percent of orable farmland* The State also controlled 25 per­
cent of all industry, large construction companies, hotels, real estate, 
shops, an airline and a fishing fleet* The government also nationalized 
the financial system* However, due to the mined condition of the 
this amounted to a government assumption of debt* Report 
sold directly to the Institute of Internal-External Commerce Which 
them abroad, with the earnings of the middleman role going to the govern- 
o«nt.137
135
One of the first official statements issued by the 
its economic position was the 1980 economic Man, which 
December, 1979* Due to the chastic state #£ the pest revolutiee 
the government based its plans on a balanced budget system, 
ment, worried about the early experiences of m M *  and Cuba, 
wages and increased taxes and exchange controls. file implsmentatiao of
foreign exchange controls snabled ths government to allocate expenditures 
to essential supplies such mi oil eml food stuffs, thus preventing the 
conversion of local currency incomes end financial assets into imported 
luxury goods.139 This plan acknowledged the private sector as vital,1*** 
and guaranteed the private sector reasonable profits, while specifying that 
the private sector must sveii tax evasion, capital flight and speculation.1*1 
The complete structure of the Hicaraguan economy in 1980 wast
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Public Sector Capitalist Sector Small Producers
Production C%) (1) (%)
Agriculture 21 29 50
Manufacturing 25 45 30
Construction 70 5 25
Mining 95 5 —
Subtotalt
Material Production 25 37 38





espert 26 59 15
Reports 75 25 —
Imports 45 55 —
Internal Trad# 30 35 35
Accumulation 
Fixed Investment 82 13 5
Credit Granted 100 — —
Credit Received 4© 40 20
Eoonomicslly 
Active Population 21 26 53
SOURCE i MILPAN (The Nicaraguan Ministry of Planning)1*2
Tha private sector clearly playad a considerable role under the I960 
eooncaiic plan.
PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSE* THE FIRST YEAR
Tha concept of a mixed economy employed in Nicaragua dapandad on sub­
stantial economic participation by tha private sector knit only a minority
143•bare of political power. The San&inistas intended to incorporate the 
bulk af tha Nicaraguan population in tha political process* Since the 
private sector formed a minority sector within the Nicaraguan population, 
any attempt to base political authority on numerical strength diminished 
private sector political clout. But the Sandinistas also wanted the private
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sector to invest and produce efficiently, thus aiding the process of re­
construction, These tendencies conflicted repeatedly, having a cooling 
effect on what was at best a lukewarm alliance. The private sector in 
general harbored a deep feat of the long range goals of the movement, 
suspecting that their role was merely temporary,144 Every move which the 
FSLN made in a leftward direction reinforced private sector uncertainty. 
Enrique Dreyfus, one of the main leaders of COSEP, best sunned up this 
uncertainty. Dreyfus said *we are making revolution right now. We in
the private sector feel part of it.* Dreyfus emphasised the need for
145both production and the efficient distribution of wealth. However, 
Dreyfus, also said he worried about the *Marxist-Leninist* influence in 
the revolution and said *who is going to risk money when you don9t know 
where you are going?*144 During this period the private sector was moti­
vated primarily by ideological concern.
Throughout this first year the conflict between FSLN political goals 
and private sector uncertainly about this direction of the movement created 
periods of tensions followed by FSLN attempts at appeasement. In December, 
1979 La Frensa ran a full page ad detailing the disagreement between COSEP 
and the Government. COSEP threatened to withdraw baaed on two major com­
plaints, the increasing authority being given to Sandinieta organised 
trade unions and increasing State participation in the economy,147 COSEP 
then decided to cooperate with the government. However, the uncertainty 
felt in the business oonmunity was noted by Willimn Baez Sacasa, a spokes­
man for COSEP. Sacasa saidi "we endorse the plan* But now we have to sell 
it to the business community.*144
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In December, 1979 all cabinet members submitted their resignations 
subject to reapproval so that the FSLN Directorate and the Governing Junta 
could make changes deemed necessary as the post-Some*a government developed* 
The FSLN Directorate made two important changes. Henry Ruiz replaced 
Robert© Mayorga, a conservative economist and leading private sector 
figure as head of the Ministry of Planning, Ruiz was a Civil Mar Com* 
mandante and a member of the Saadinieta GPP tendency. The second important 
change was the replacement by Humberto Ortega, a Tercerista, of Bernardino 
Larios, a dissident National Guard Colonel as Mlnieter of Defense. Al­
though the Sar.d ini etas retained Arturo Curz as heed of tee Central Bank
and Joaqufn Cuadra Chamorro, as Minister of nuance, the private sector
1#9feared the Sandiniatas intended a leftist takeover.
Relations between the Saedlniatas reeched a crisis point when a
family dispute at jg Prensa developed into a strike which closed the plant
lieon April 20, 1980. This dispute had its rests in the role M  Prespa
played following the 197# assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro* La
Prensa offices became the headquarters for the opposition movement.
Several members of the FSLN worked as reporters for jg Prensa. Following
tha Revolution, Carlos Chamorro, son of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, became
the Editor of Barricade, the official Sandinista Party newspaper* Xavier
Chamorro, the brother of Pedro, stayed at |g Prensa as an editor. Xavier
strongly supported the Sandinista*. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Jr., brother
of Carlos, also edited |g Prensa bet supported the private sector. Violeta
Barrios Chamorro sided with Carlos in an attempt to remove Xavier from
La Prensas* staff. Because of this attempt, the Sandinista controlled
151newsprint union went on strike, closing the paper.
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COSEP demanded the La Prenaa strike be solved in favor of the pro­
business faction. They viewed this as a demonstration of the Sandinistas 
commitment to pluraliam, since La Prensa expressed COSEP's demands. In 
an important concession to the private sector, the Sandinistas agreed 
to this solution. Before the government acted, the Chamorro's settled 
their differences independently by giving Xavier 25 percent of La Pranas' a
capital to start his own paper, Nueno Dlarlo. Thus, La Prenaa retained
152its traditional role as the voice of the conservative opposition.
Divisions within the Governing Junta developed at the sane time as 
the ^  Prensa crisis, cm April If, if if Violeta Chamorro resigned from 
the Junta citing reasons of poor health* on April 22, If SO Alfonso 
Robelo resigned in protest over the proposed composition of the Council 
of State, The Council of State is an advisory body to the Governing Junta 
and the supreme Wiceraguan authority, the fSLN Directorate. Originally 
the organisaciona mhicIt overthrew Somers comprised the meafeership. The 
Sandinistas claimed tdo* some of the orgomismeionB used to overthrow
Somosa no longer existed and new ones had developed, so changes were
153necessary in the Council of State.
These new organisacions referred to by «he Sandinistas are the Haas 
Organisaciona (OHS). The OMS formed the cornerstone of the FSLM1s political 
goal of incorporating formally excluded segments of the population in the 
political process**5* The dispute reflected the conflict between the 
private sectors economic strength but relatively small numbers and the 
FSLti's desire to develop mass based political participation* The inclusion 
of the OHS resulted in the FSLN and its associated popular associations
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having a majority of forty-seven seats, instead of strong minority re-
155presentation in the previously planned thirty-three seats* Private
sector groups receiving a note were;
Nicaraguan Development Institute
Chamber of Industries
Confederation of Chambers of Commerce
Chambers of Construction
Union of Nicaraguan Agricultural Producers
National union of Farmers and Cattle Ranchers
Private sector political parties receiving a vote were the;
independent Liberal Party 
Nicaraguan Democratic Movement 
Nicaraguan Democratic Conservative Party 
Social Christian Party***
The Council of State had its first formal meeting on May 4, 1980.
The inauguration of the Council of State highlights several political
trends occurring in Nicaragua at this time* The Sandinistas altered the
composition of their benefit, which produced a strong reaction in the
private sector culminating in Alfonso Robelos resignation* The Sandinistas
then took steps to appease the private sector. They ended confiscations,
passed a law protecting citizens from abuse of authority and made a corn-
157mitment to announce an election timetable, which was set for 1985*
When the Council of State met, all six seats for the private sector were
filled, although the MDN, the Social Christian Party and the Democratic
158Conservative Party failed to attend* The Sandinistas then moved to
defuse the overall political crisis by appointing two leading private
sector individuals to replace Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Barrios Chamorro,
Arturo Cruz and Rafael Cordova Rivas* La Prensa reappeared on May 26,
1591980, further reducing tensions* These interactions between the private
sector and the Sandinistas indicate that political pluralism allowing both
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confrontation and compromise existed at this time.
The 1980 Economic Flan provided the private sector with a choice*
They could continue production, earn smaller profits and be efficient or
expropriated* The private sector, not completely confident about their
role in the revolution, responded by participating at a minimum level,
using state funds to regain previous operating capacity but not investing
in a manner significant enough to produce expansion***0 Benjamin Lanzas
Silva, president of a large construction company, described a significant
part of the private sector when he saidt
we are looking for a third way, something that combines 
the best of the capitalist system and the best of the 
socialist system* But we don't see much good about 
socialism, to be honest with you* 1*3.
Thus, one year aft^r the Revolution, the private sector still controlled 
a large portion of the economy particulary in vital export areas and was 
able to exert a significant degree of political influence*
CHAPTER IV: THE RETRENCHHENT OF POLITICAL PLURALISM
CHANGING UNITED STATES POLICY AND NICARAGUAN POLITICAL EVENTS
The United States under the Carter administration had its closest
ties to business groups, the American Institute for Free Labor Develop-
162ment and conservative political parties. Following the Revolution,
the United States sent ten to fifteen million in emergency relief to
Nicaragua. Shortly thereafter, the Carter administration proposed a
163$75 million aid backage aimed at reinforcing the private sector.
In January, 1980 hearings on this aid reached the House and Senate. During 
these hearings the Congress added several restrictions on the aid's use.
The aid package passed on February 27, 1980 but died when the Senate halted 
appropriations pending further resolutions. For two and one half months 
the bill remained unacted upon, in June, 1980 the President had to 
certify that Nicaragua did not export repression before the aid could 
be disbursed. Finally, in September, 1980 some United States aid began to 
appear in Nicaragua. The Carter administration, although it proved unable 
to correctly assess the political climate prior to Somoza's fall or provide 
substantial assistance to the new government for an extended period after 
it achieved power, at least did not assume an openly hostile stance towards 
the Sandinista regime. This position encouraged the growth of political 
and civil liberties within Nicaragua. Because of the ideological affinity 
between the Nicaraguan private sector and the United States government, 
recognition by the United States government of the validity of the Sandinista 
regime tended to encourage cooperation between the Nicaraguan private sector 
and the regime, as well as vice versa.
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This recognition of Sandinista validity was to be reversed by the
victory of the Reagan administration in the 1980 Presidential election*
The Republican Platform explicitly statedi
we deplore the Marxist Sandinista takeover of 
Nicaragua and the Marxist attempts to dest&bilize 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras* We do not 
support United States assistance to any Marxist 
government in this Hemisphere, and we oppose the 
Carter administration aid program for the 
government of NicaraguaA**
The assumption to the Presidency of a hardline anti-Sandinista encouraged 
a flurry of political activity within the Nicaraguan private sector* Two 
weeks after the United States elections COSEP issued a thirty page document 
charging the regime with monopolising political power, reneging on pro­
mises to hold early elections and preparing to implement in Nicaragua "a
communist political and economic project, with totalitarian state capitalism
165and consequent restrictions on all civil liberties*" The PSLN Directorate 
banned a MDN rally in Nandame on Sunday, November 9, 1 9 8 0 Rafael 
Cordova Rivas, a private sector Junta member said the banning was necessary 
for security reasons (it coincided with a series of contra attacks)* How­
ever, after this banning a mass of Sandinist youths attacked MDN head­
quarters. These two incidents caused the entire Conservative opposition
167to walk out frcm the Council of State* A much more serious incident 
followed this walkout*
On November 17, 1980 Jorge Salazar, President of the Nicaraguan Coffee
Growers Association, died in an armed confrontation with security forces
168at El Crucero, twelve miles outside of Managua* Salazar was also the
acting head of COSEP and the leader of UPANXC, the landowners organization*169
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Apparently Army Major Alvarado Baltodano infiltrated a group led by
Salasar. Posing as sympathetic to their cause# he managed to uncover a 
170major plot, Salazar's brother# Alejandro# was arrested along with
Jos6 Mario Hannon Talanera# President of the Nicaraguan Rice Growers 
171Association# Leonardo Somarriba# Vice President of the Chamber of
Industry and Jaime Castillo# the Managing Director of the Managalpa
172Coffee Cooperative. On November 23# 1980 Leonardo Somarriba confessed
173to the plot at a police press conference. Although a great deal of 
speculation surrounded this incident# it worsened relations between the 
Sandinistas and the private sector.
ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Two-thirds of Ni cargos'a energy came from oil burning thermal power 
stations. In 1980 this resulted in an outflow of $165 million. The out­
flow equalled Nicaragua's coffee exports. The 1981 oil bill would reach 
$256 million. This equalled coffee# sugar and shrimp exports. This out­
flow, combined with Nicaragua's severe foreign debt created a lack of
cash which led to a lade of spare p a r t s T h i s  prevented the reactivation
175of machinery already possessed. The need for hard cash caused the
government to leave the export market overwhelming ly in the hands of the 
176private sector. Despite the government providing extensive credit and
working capital# encouraging labor productivity and discouraging excessive 
177wage demands# the private sector did not invest. Although the private
sector absorbed more than 80 percent of state investment and foreign ex-
178change in 1980/81# private investment dropped from eighty percent of 
total investment in 1978 to ten percent in 1981. Capital flight# which
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would reach the level of $140 million by January, 1902 became a major
179problem as decapitalisation increased.
Decapitalization refers to a variety of methods used to sabotage the
economy and defraud the government. One example of decapitalization is
the case of Lamsa Chemicals, a small cosmetics factory located on the
outskirts of Managua. The recently unionised workers at Lamsa suspected
that the owner, Alberto Mantilla, ran down production. In July, 1931 the
workers discovered a stack of stationary inscribed industries Mantilla,
180San Jose, Costa Rica.w The government intervened, and Mantilla became 
an exile in Costa Rica.
A rural example is the 2,800 acre Hacienda Mamaslf, owned by Alfonso
Ramos. Located near the Honduran border, this estate employed over two
hundred workers before the Revolution. In 1981, it employed only twenty-
seven. Ramos stripped the estate of all machinery (tractors, harvestors
and irrigation pumps) which were sold. Ramos then converted the money
into dollars and smuggled out of the country. By mid 1981, the ATC
(Peasants Union) claimed that over seventy percent of the private sector
181farms in southeastern Nicaragua were being purposely neglected. These 
selected Incidents highlight the seriousness of the decapitalization 
problem.
1981 was designated the Year of the Defense and Production. The 1981 
Economic Plan, Austerity and Economic Efficiency, aimed for a twenty-two 
percent increase in industrial production and a 45.3 percent increase in 
investment. The government hoped to boost productivity and bring a halt 
to tax evasion and capital flight. However, 1981 was to prove a year in 
which external political and economic opposition, combined with internal 
opposition to the economic aims of the Revolution, cenwered in the private
sector# would lead to a higher degree of political repression.
THE REAGAN CAMPAIGN
The first economic move made by Reagan administration against the
Sandinista government suspended United States aid to Nicaragua, The United
States mispended $15 million still remaining from the Carter aid package
as well as $9,6 million credit for the purchase of vitally needed wheat 
182supplies. The Reagan administration invoked section 533(f) of the
Foreign Assistance Act# which provides for the termination of Economic
Support Funds to countries supporting violence in other countries. The
Administration admitted that:
we have no hard evidence of arms movements through 
Nicaragua during the past few weeks# and propaganda _  
and some other support activities have been curtailed.
Members of the private sector expressed dismay at the plans to end
United States aid, Arturo Cruz said:
A suppression of United States aid would be very 
negative and counterproductive. Political pluralism 
and the right to dissent would be affected. The 
economic crisis would be translated into a real 
radicalization and Nicaragua would have to look to 
other blocks for funds.
Alfonso Robelo also criticized the Reagan administration plans for sus­
pending aid to the private sector# saying that aid would increase the
185strength of the private sector. The United States then made attempts
186to block loans to Nicaragua from the Inter-American Development Bank.
The Reagan administration contended that these monks were not an attempt 
to destabilize the Sandinistas'# but rather an attempt to halt the alleged 
flow of arms to El Salvador. In mid-December, 1981 the Reagan administration
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informed Congress that the CIA was involved in para military oonert
187action aimed at Nicaragua. Since that time, the CIA has trained, paid, 
and supplied counterrevolutionaries, primarily in Honduras.*** These 
moves are of extreme significance to the Nicaraguan private sector be­
cause they are instrumental in creating the security crisis within which 
the private sector must operate.
PRIVATE SECTOR ALIENATION
On February 11, 1981 Nicaraguan government ordered the temporary
closure of the local Human Rights Commission, changing its leader, Jose
Estaban Gonzalez, with carrying out a campaign of defamation against the
Sandinistas. During an audience with the Pope, Gonzales said that the
Sandinist regime applies methods of torture and repression very similar
to those prevailing during the Somoza dictatorship. He also claimed that
there were eight thousand political prisoners in Nicaragua and that eight
189hundred people had "disappeared" since the Revolution. Rafael Cordova
Rivas, a private sector representative on the Junta, said that Gonzalez,
190"openly lied" in Rome, Gonzalez was freed on March 3, 1981 when he
191retracted his criticism, saying he had been misunderstood. The dismissal 
of charges shows a significant effort by the FSLN Directorate to appease 
the private sector, reduce building tensions and maintain a degree of 
pluralism.
In September, 1981 the government enacted the Measures of Economic and 
Social Emergency. These measures attempted to resolve the deficits in 
production and productivity damaging the Nicaraguan economy. The govern­
ment wanted to stop the increase in decapitalization, the speculative
-48
attitudes of business, the lack of investment by the private sector as 
well as labor strikes, work stoppages, absenteeism and unnecessary 
bureacratisation. These measures responded to external attacks, internal
sabotage and economic destabilisation. These measures fell far short of 
the "State of Seige" response which occurs quite frequently in Latin 
America, in which all civil rights are suspended, curfews are declared and 
arrests or "disappearances" without due process are routine occurrences.
An increase in attacks upon Nicaragua led to the upgrading of these 
measures. On March 15, 1982 the FSLN Directorate declared a State of 
National Emergency. This State of Emergency imposed censorship, the sus­
pension of the right to liberty and habeuj corpus and the right is freedom
192of travel. However, torture and summary execution were unknown. The
practical effect of the State of National Emergency has been an increase
in troop mobilizacion, including control over the media and a decline,
though not a disappearance in opposition political activity.
A major incident between the Sandinista government and the private
sector occurred due to the publication by COSEP of a letter charging the
regime with following the path towards a "Marxist-Lenninist adventure
193which will bring bloodshed and suffering to our people." The FSLN 
arrested Enrique Dreyfus, Gilberto Cuardra, Benjamin Lonsas and Enrique 
Boladas, all leading members of COSEP. Dreyfus, Cuadra and Lanzas 
were eventually convicted for violating the Measures of Economic and Social 
Baarcency. During the period of these arrests Arturo Crus retired as 
Ambassador to the United States. This was a definite setback for the
government. Cruz, a member of the Group of Twelve, became a key private
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sector individual with a long history of cooperation with the Sandinistas.
Crus had wide respect internationally. Although Crus stated that he gave
his full support to the Sandinista government, his resignation probably
was caused by his disapproval of the imprisonment of the COSEP leaders,
195one of whom (Enrique Dreyfus) was a close personal friend. Crus now
resides in Bethesrla, Maryland and, although this is not certain, is rumored
196to be working with Eddn Pastors. Francisco Fiallos, a Harvard haw
197School graduate who studied political science at Georgetown.
On Monday, March 8, 1982 the FSLN released the three business leaders
while simultaneously announcing export incentives to the private sector.
These provisions allowed exporters of cotton, coffee, sugar and meat to
trade foreign exchange on the parallel market at twenty-three corck
the dollar rather than the office rate of ten cordobas to the dollar.
The law also permitted exporters to use foreign income to import machinery
198and acquire dollars at a rate of fifteen to one for non-essential items.
Enrique Dreyfus called the export Incentives "one of the first pragmatic
199measures with economic criteria.*
By this time, the Sandinistas, although generally popular, faced growing 
discontent, primarily in the private sector but also in other segments of 
the population. This discontent was caused primarily by Nicaragua's 
economic problems. Alfredo Cesar, President of Nicaragua's Central Bank,
said i
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No one considers the Sandinista ideologies remotely 
as corrupt as the Scmosa's, hot the citizenry is ho 
longer starryeyes about the Rebels*200
Cesar resigned on May 12, 1982, claiming that new taxes removed export
incentives and protested against the creation of a monetary council which
201he claimed made decisions on a political and not an economic basis*
The Sandinistas claimed Cesar kept in contact with Eddn Pastora, now 
actively conspiring to overthrow the regime* Cesar did not fight with the 
Sandinista*s but he sympathized with their cause and immediately found a 
job in the post-Revolutionary government. Cesar first went to the United 
States where he joined a team led by former Perusian Finance Minister
Javier Silva Ruete which is handling the renegotiation of Costa Rica's
202 203external debt. He currently resides in Costa Rica* Luis Enrique
204Figuersa replaced Cesar*
The Sandinista government lost another key private sector individual 
with the resignation of Francisco Fiallos, the United States Ambassador. 
Fiallos blamed the Reagan administration for increasing the militarization 
of the Nicaraguan regime but attributed his resignation to the development 
of authoritarianism during the State of National Emergency* The censor­
ship of a written interview which Fiallos submitted to La Prensa proved
205to be the last straw for Fiallos* Following the resignation, Foreign
Minister Miguel D'Escoto Brockman accused Fiallos of stealing money from
206the sale of the Nicaraguan embassils Washington mansion*
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CONCLUSION
The Nicaraguan Revolution involved all segments of the population in 
varying degrees. Factions of the private sector were active in opposition 
and thus, had a degree of post-Somoza legitimacy. Immediately following 
the Revolution a large degree of pluralism existed. Although there has 
been a diminishing of pluralism, the potential for opposition political 
activities and the aim of a mixed economy have not disappeared. Although 
statistics vary, only about forty percent of the Cross Domestic Product 
is controlled by the state sector. Nationalizations beyond the original 
expropriation of somocista property have been largely limited to businesses
2 OSinvolved in capital flight or property belonging to counterrevolutionaries.
Businesses such as the Nicaraguan Sugar Estates, owned by the Fellas family,
which is the leading private industry in Nicaragua and the largest, most
successful sugar plantation in Central America, still functioned in
209Nicaragua at the end of the period covered in this report. Two 
fundamental changes must occur if the private sector is to regain stature 
as a political force within Nicaragua. One of these changes is the private 
sector accepting its role within the Revolution. Nicaragua needs private 
sector investment to build a strong export sector. The private sector 
response to this opportunity has not only been insufficient, it has been 
negative. The spread cf decapitalization and capital flight caused severe 
damage to an already fragile, damaged economy. The private sector re­
ceived strong support from the government in the way of financing and other 
incentives to produce. Instead of increasing, investment plummeted. This 
drop originated in private sector fear of Sandinista ideological goals.
J
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However# the spread of increasingly fradulent decapitalisation techniques 
and the refusal to invest more than the capital the government provided 
caused the Nicaraguan private sector to miss a historic chance. A 
vibrant private sector operating within a socialist framework might have 
presented a model capable of dealing with Nicaragua's severe economic 
dislocation. The private sector had validity in post-Somosa Nicaragua 
because it participated in the Revolution. To regain that validity the 
private sector must continue to participate.
The second fundamental change which must occur if pluralism is to 
regain lost ground in Nicaragua is an end to the guerrilla campaigns which 
threaten the existence of the Nicaraguan government* Political tolerance 
does not develop in countries which are defending themselves from in­
creasing forces. This second factor is actually the more important of 
the two# because as long as Nicaragua is under assult the development of 
mutual confidence between the private sector and the government cannot
occur.
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